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The primary question which animates this inquiry is: How should we understand the role 
of contingency in contemporary theoretical schematizations of subjectivity and indebtedness? To 
clarify the question and to arrive at some possible answers, I make use of the phrase “debt-as-
ground” in order to coax out the above question from the writings of both David Graeber and 
Maurizio Lazzarato, two scholars whose writings have enjoyed much attention in the arena of 
contemporary debt scholarship. In my rhetorical utilization of the term, which I borrow from 
Tamara Caraus, “debt-as-ground” acts as a label for any theory which claims that debt serves to 
fundamentally characterize human life socially, economically, and politically. As the phrase is 
meant to suggest, the arguments to which this label is attached are ones which are guilty of 
essentializing the social as though having necessary and fundamental grounds, ostensibly in 
indebtedness. Caraus contends that Graeber and Lazzarato, perhaps against their better wishes, 
each fall into such a trap. Against this interpretation, I argue that their projects are better 
understood as debt-centric analyses which highlight the ubiquity, but not the necessity of debt. 
Rather than adhering to such a view of debt-as-ground in the final analysis, Graeber and 
Lazzarato each experiment with such a mode of thinking in order to reveal key insights about 
debt confined to market logics. However, they always do so in a manner compatible with the 
assumed contingency of debt relations. To argue for such a conclusion, I trace the reception of 
Nietzsche in both Graeber’s and Lazzarato’s accounts. I claim that Nietzsche’s argument in the 
second essay in On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), which is perhaps the earliest example of a 
theory of debt-as-ground, far from being emblematic of Graeber’s or Lazzarato’s thought (or 
even his own), rather serves to articulate a view common to all three: namely that it is the 
flagrant logic of market economies which seeks a totalizing account of the social, but that such 
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an account need not be assumed as natural, originary, or fixed. I argue that we must accept the 
utterly contingent nature of social relations of indebtedness, and I conclude with a call to 
reexamine what alternatives and escape routes might exist for the prevailing debtor subject. 
 






















Having come of age politically in the years immediately following the Occupy Wall 
Street movement, I have given much thought to not only those formative events in Zuccotti Park, 
but also the plurality of dreams and aspirations to which those events gave voice. I recall vividly 
the media portrayal of chanting bodies, makeshift signs, and haphazard tent city, all coalescing 
into the starkness of political confrontation apparent in the mere fact of their being-there, 
together. Despite having carved out a community within a public space, it was clear that, at least 
from the perspective implicit in the media frenzy, those protesters did not belong there. At the 
time I assumed that these events were unique: that a massive convergence of angry bodies 
without a clear set of demands must have signaled a unique historical rupture. The cure for such 
blind optimism has proven to be an engagement with the corpus of writings produced during that 
time, which on the whole speak to the sheer number of disagreements and contestations which 
characterized the period. Although Occupy was not successful in altogether subverting the power 
of politicians and Wall Street bankers to exercise increasing control over life, it would 
nonetheless be glaringly dishonest to claim that Occupy did not have a massive impact on 
contemporary politics.   
As I began this project, I was faced with the dread of feeling as though I had missed out 
on the opportunity to weigh in on the activities spurred on by Occupy in all its complexity: the 
on-the-ground debates, the critics and detractors, the warring factions, and the offshoots and 
splinter groups all included. However, as I have worked to engage with the debates and 
assumptions which animated the period, I have found that (perhaps unsurprisingly) many of 
these are far from being conclusively resolved. One debate in particular, whose ripeness for 
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discussion has yet to expire, centers around the immense difficulty there is to be found in the 
project of unravelling debtor subjectivity. For some context, one of the major projects of Occupy 
(and this was true of a number of its splinter groups as well) was to work collectively and 
consciously to attempt to awaken masses of people to their shared plights. As we shall see in 
what follows, mechanisms of control have increasingly worked through processes of exclusion, 
individualization, and atomization in order to keep people separated from one another, engulfed 
in their own precarious situations, and too afraid to seek help in the form of a collective leverage 
from others due to, in simple terms, the immense feelings of shame which accompany being in 
debt. Occupy splinter group Strike Debt! sought to scale up these concerns, extending beyond 
Zuccotti Park into a concrete political organization. Their ensuing activities (which represent the 
second mass debt resistance movement in recent U.S. memory, after the 90s anti-globalization 
movement), helped to generate much discussion and debate concerning the nature of 
indebtedness not strictly in economic terms, but also in terms of how the condition of being in 
debt comes to impact how we think, how we perceive time, how we plan for the future, how we 
understand ourselves, how we act: in short, how we live. 
This thesis is impelled by the urgency of determining how a specific form of subjectivity 
could have become so impressively widespread. For, as we find, indebtedness is no longer a 
category reserved for an unlucky few but is rather one which today captures nearly all of us. I 
experiment with a variety of theoretical angles in an effort to argue that while there are good 
reasons for accepting the view that debtor subjectivity is a very real condition of modern life, 
there are also good reasons to think that subjectivity always assumes the condition of 
malleability: that, in other words, the possibilities for change (for better or for worse) are always 
there. In short, this thesis is motivated by the belief that while we are in fact debtors (not in the 
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sense of merely owing something to someone, but rather in the stricter sense of embodying 
debtor subjectivity), we do have it within our power to become otherwise, and further that the 























I.     Introduction  
A Primer on Debt Resistance 
Over the course of the last two decades, there have been two broad waves of debt 
resistance activism in the U.S. The first came out the so-called anti-globalization movement of 
the late 90s1. Debt resistance organizing in this period took the form of innumerable protests at 
meetings held by the World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary 
Fund. Demands focused on ending structural adjustment policies and cancelling the national 
debts of developing nations. Then, after a nearly ten-year hiatus, debt resistance reemerged on 
the heels of the 2008 financial crash by means of the ensuing Occupy Wall Street movement. As 
for Occupy, the tale is now a familiar one. On September 17th, 2011, a meager hundred or so 
protestors descended on a small Manhattan park in the nearly literal shadow of the global 
financial center. The protests quickly intensified, giving way to a round-the-clock encampment 
and occupation. A couple of hundred protestors erected tents and camped in the park while many 
more participated in activities daily. In the couple of months which followed, hundreds of similar 
protests erupted in cities across the country. This scaling up and multiplication of participation 
across vast distances helped it garner international attention and intrigue. It helped that this 
movement emerged on the heels of the Arab Spring, during which the rapid spread of 
information by way of the internet had given birth to newly realized virtual networks of political 
participation and engagement. Further yet, it had the backing of a range of popular academics, 
including Noam Chomsky, David Graeber, and Andrew Ross, along with media-savvy Adbusters 
                                               
1 By way of acknowledgements, I would like to express my gratitude to both members of 
my thesis committee, Professor Philip Armstrong and Professor Miranda Martinez, for the 
immensity of their combined help, patience, and generosity throughout this endeavor.  
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editors Kalle Lasn and Micah White2. However, there is little doubt that once in full swing, the 
movement was under the control of no particular individual or faction. On this account it was 
widely dubbed an ‘experiment in democracy.’   
It has long been en vogue in certain political circles to describe Occupy’s lack of 
traditional, centralized organization as its most exciting trait, though also the fault which more or 
less guaranteed its eventual unravelling. It is surely no secret that discourses surrounding Occupy 
have been mixed since the initial occupation of Zuccotti Park in 2011. Numerous commentators 
expressed exasperation with what they saw as a “lack of focus on strategy or organizing” 
(Ackerman, 2012). The group’s commitment to consensus-based, bottom-up democratic 
decision-making was widely criticized for being painfully slow-moving as well as severely 
limiting its generative potential. 
Regardless of how one feels about Occupy and its lasting political import, it does deserve 
credit for reigniting debt resistance organizing, which had been largely dormant for nearly a 
decade following the 1999 “Battle of Seattle” World Trade Organization protests. Among its on-
the-ground campaigns was the Occupy Student Debt Campaign (OSDC) which, according to a 
statement, “was launched at Zuccotti Park in November 2011 with the goal of building a student 






                                               
2 Lasn and White of Adbusters are generally credited with having conceived of the original 
protest which became Occupy.  
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1. Free public education, through federal coverage of tuition fees. 
2. Zero-interest student loans, so that no one can profit from them.  
3. Fiscal transparency at all universities, public as well as private. 
4. The elimination of current student debt, through a single act of relief.  
(Occupy Wall Street, “A Statement”) 
 
Following their eviction from the park, OSDC organizers launched Occupy splinter group 
Strike Debt! Though they shifted their immediate focus from student debt to consumer debt, they 
maintained their commitment to abolition, claiming: “Because we are forced to go into debt 
simply in order to live, we think it is right and moral to resist it” (Strike Debt, 2014).  
In an exchange with Strike Debt activist and sociologist Andrew Ross, Seth Ackerman 
identifies the “highly atomized and dispersed form of social domination” which characterizes 
consumer debt (Ackerman, 2012). This atomizing feature of debt serves to cordon off individuals 
from one another, causing them to feel embarrassed and alone. Governance of individuals 
through atomization works through what J. M. Gore labels disciplinary techniques of exclusion: 
“the negative side of normalization … a technique for tracing the limits that will define 
difference, defining boundaries, setting zones,” as well as classification: “differentiating groups 
of individuals from one another, classifying them, classifying oneself” (Gore, 1995). Strike Debt 
sought to upend these atomizing features of debt by practicing counter-techniques of inclusion. A 
particularly salient example of this was Strike Debt’s publicly-held and highly visible “debt 
speak-outs” (Ackerman, 2012). Debt speak-outs offered a way for those suffering from debt to, 
as the name suggests, speak out publicly about their individual struggles in a way which 
resonated with others while in an open forum setting. These speak-outs empowered individuals 
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to confront, with the support of a broader community, the deep feelings of guilt and shame which 
have come to characterize the lives of those chronically in debt.  
Strike Debt is perhaps best known for its debt buyback campaign, dubbed the “Rolling 
Jubilee.” The campaign worked by exploiting a weakness in the procedural flow of debt 
collections. Normally, when an individual owes on a loan, he or she enjoys certain legal 
protections. Banks are limited in what they can and cannot do to attempt to collect on defaulted 
loans. In order to get around this, banks sell debt in default to collections agencies (sometimes 
for mere cents on the dollar), in order to recover, at the very least, some greater than zero sum. It 
is at this point in the procedural flow that harassment tends to abound. Though some of the same 
laws which apply to banks apply to collections agencies too, it becomes much more difficult to 
hold them to the same standard of accountability. The prevalence of harassment by collections 
agencies stemming from defaulted payments largely motivated Strike Debt’s push to, as they 
called it, “abolish” all consumer debt.   
Examining the name “Rolling Jubilee” helps clarify what exactly debt “abolition” is 
imagined to entail. Borrowed from the Jubilee 2.0 campaign of the anti-globalization movement 
days, “jubilee” invokes the early Near Eastern practice of forgiving debts following every forty-
ninth year: 
 
And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all 
the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubile [sic] unto you; and ye shall return every man 
unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family (Leviticus 25:10 KJV). 
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Through what they termed a “Rolling Jubilee,” Strike Debt bought debt that was in 
default directly from lenders for just cents on the dollar, much like a credit agency would. Except 
instead of harassing and threatening debtors until they paid the debt back, Strike Debt simply 
forgave the debt (or as they preferred, abolished it), thus wiping the slate clean. The Rolling 
Jubilee thus functioned by taking advantage of some of the same privileges afforded to 
collections agencies (which often result in harassment and threats) and then using these 
privileges to dispense with the usual procedure altogether. As of December 2017, Strike Debt 
had raised over $700,000, which they then used to forgive $31 million in consumer debt 
(“Rolling Jubilee,” 2012).  
* * * 
The above primer on recent debt resistance movements is important to establish, since 
questions about tactics have tended to loom over and give motivation for much of the critical 
writing on debt in the past decade. A particularly forceful example of this comes out of a paper 
by political theorist Tamara Caraus, “Debt Resistance: Beyond or Within Capitalism?” (Caraus, 
2016). Writing in response to well-known social theorists David Graeber and Maurizio 
Lazzarato, Caraus argues that owing to their lack of attentiveness to the radically contingent 
nature of debt, each of these theorists against their better wishes position debt as though 
foundational, as in a sense insurmountable, thus stifling possibilities for resistance. After 
developing more fully the concept of contingency that informs the argument in the pages that 
follow, I will argue that, though their debt-centric analyses do highlight the ubiquity of debt, this 
ubiquity can still be compatible with a recognition of the contingency of social relations. To 
arrive at such an argument, I consider the reception of Nietzsche in Graeber’s Debt: The First 
5,000 Years and Lazzarato’s The Making of Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal 
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Condition, two seminal post-financial crash texts on debt that were published contemporaneous 
























II.     Debt-as-Ground 
Social Theory and the Status of Foundations 
 In her critique of David Graeber and Maurizio Lazzarato, political theorist Tamara 
Caraus begins with a survey of recent debt resistance movements, focusing in particular on 
Strike Debt. She critiques their chief tactic of debt buybacks, the Rolling Jubilee which, in her 
view, rather than being a form of “debt resistance to a financial economy that creates debt,” 
instead merely acts as a reaction against the financialized economy (Caraus, 2016: 139). Instead 
of challenging the entire system of debt in a truly radical and fundamental way, the argument 
instead involves “becoming indebted and then calling for debt forgiveness” (Caraus, 2016: 139). 
She is therefore interested in arguments which prompt the offensive (true debt resistance) rather 
than the defensive (mere debt forgiveness). Interestingly, the Occupy Student Debt Campaign 
(OSDC), which itself morphed into Strike Debt, showed an awareness of the shortcomings of 
“forgiveness” as a conceptual scheme. Directly following the passage in the statement cited 
above, OSDC says that “debt ‘forgiveness’” is “an unfortunate term that implies the debtor has 
sinned,” an implication to which they were quite clearly opposed (OSDC, 2012). One of the 
reasons why it is so difficult to argue against the entire debt system at large is that, at least in 
Caraus’ view, even the most radical debt scholars promote “arguments which make debt 
foundational and inhibit debt resistance instead of radicalizing it” (Caraus, 2016: 139). 
Throughout her critiques of Graeber and Lazzarato, the theoretical debates find their initiative 
from a prior tactical critique of Strike Debt. We will return to Caraus’ critiques of Graeber and 
Lazzarato shortly, but first let us consider a phrase of hers that may prove to be of great use.  
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Though it appears only a few times in Caraus’ article, the phrase “debt-as-ground” 
cleverly provokes and anticipates her argument concerning contemporary debt scholarship and 
its impoverished acknowledgement of contingency. To help coax out and motivate the debate, it 
is helpful to develop the phrase “debt-as-ground” more fully into a concept which can be applied 
as a test for theories that may be guilty of neglecting the theoretical importance of contingency. 
Let us consider the phrase debt-as-ground. If “debt” is taken “as ground,” then this suggests that 
it is a foundation, a fundament upon which other things must rest. Debt-as-ground then refers to 
the idea that human social relations are, at their most basic, debt relations. By debt relations, we 
mean the relationship which defines the relation of a debtor to a creditor, or in other words a 
borrower to a lender. To put it differently, theories labelled as debt-as-ground are those which 
suggest that the most basic human relationship, constitutive in some way of human social, 
economic, and political life at large, is that which exists between a lender and a borrower. 
Having established the meaning of this phrase, debt-as-ground, it is next necessary to 
describe why debt-as-ground theories, as formulated here, will prove to be so problematic. The 
problem presented by debt-as-ground theories is two-fold. First, to view debt as the basic ground 
upon which all social life rests is to fall into the trap of making debt resistance at least appear 
futile. Why should debt resistors attempt to abolish the condition of indebtedness; indeed, what 
sense would it make for Strike Debt to call for debt abolition if social life itself depends on it in 
some crucial sense? At best, the rhetorical pronouncements and rallying cries of debt resistance 
movements will sound utterly misguided. At worst, the entire project of debt resistance will be, 
in point of fact, doomed from the very start. Such is the conceptual risk when one fails to 
acknowledge the contingent nature of social relations: for if we see the way things are as 
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necessary, as universal, as simply natural, then we have already abandoned the theoretical tools 
needed to change the way things are. 
Related to this is the problem Lyotard saw with grand narratives. Any view of debt-as-
ground (in which indebtedness is taken as the necessary context for social relations) will involve 
an overarching narrative which claims to provide totalizing answers concerning how things are 
and why they are the way they are. Having moved beyond modernity and its reliance on 
metanarratives, the state of knowledge is today increasingly undermined by what Lyotard terms 
the “postmodern condition,” where he defines postmodern as “incredulity toward 
metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv). Knowledge today demands more complexity, more 
subtlety, perhaps achieved through the preponderance of a plurality of narratives, rather than 
singular, purportedly complete, and totalizing ones. For this reason, Caraus, invoking Butler, 
argues that “the point is not to do away with foundations” but rather to critically interrogate their 
use, and recognize that any narratives, any proposed foundations, will be necessarily incomplete: 
no single one will tell the complete story and neither can it be treated as though immune to the 
process of ceaseless critique (Butler, 1992: 7).  
To return to her critiques of contemporary debt scholarship, it is Caraus’ argument that 
there exist “common contradictions and shortcomings of Graeber’s and Lazzarato’s arguments 
which make debt foundational and inhibit debt resistance instead of radicalizing it” (Caraus, 
2016: 139). From the very beginning, it is thus clear that the metric with which she treats these 
theories is their ability to produce positive results in the sphere of political movements toward 
debt resistance. Her concern is that, by employing debt as a foundational concept, Graeber and 
Lazzarato each nolens volens make true debt resistance even more unattainable, because they 
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treat debt as a force which constitutes the social that can at best be managed, but never truly 
moved beyond, unlearned, or abolished.   
One of Caraus’ greatest concerns with Graeber’s and Lazzarato’s theories is that they 
seek to interrupt and delegitimize long-held grand narratives about the economy, human 
behavior, and the nature of commercial exchange, only to then reinscribe new though similarly 
totalizing metanarratives which also have the result of inhibiting possibilities for debt resistance. 
To go further, she claims that they each argue that the debt condition and its maintenance results 
from a form of false consciousness. False consciousness, a Marxian concept that like many 
others was barely developed by Marx or Engels, suggests that: 
 
To the degree to which they correspond to the given reality, thought and behavior express 
a false consciousness, responding to and contributing to the preservation of a false order 
of facts. And this false consciousness has become embodied in the prevailing technical 
apparatus which in turn reproduces it (Marcuse, 1964: 145).  
 
To argue that something is the result of false consciousness is thus to argue that it is a 
constantly reproduced manner of thinking which conceals or obscures the true nature of things, 
particularly political and economic realities. The causes can be multiple and complex, but in 
various post-Marxian usages it results from institutional, ideological, and economic processes 
meant to subjugate the working class for the benefit of, and at the behest of, the owning class. 
False consciousness as an explanatory vehicle draws criticism for locating working class 
subjugation in its own ignorance of the “true” nature of material and economic relations.  
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Contemporary debt scholarship, she contends, argues along roughly these lines in its 
insistence that debt has not only a legitimating--though false--narrative (i.e. that debt is the 
unavoidable outcome of perfectly natural market exchanges undertaken freely) but further that 
concealed behind this false narrative is a true order of things, an accurate explanation 
corresponding to a real set of material conditions and power relations which the owning class 
wants to obscure. False consciousness implies its opposite--a consciousness that is otherwise, a 
“true” (class) consciousness that (owing to its being the truth) advocates in favor of rather than 
against working class interests. Caraus takes issue with the implication in both Graeber’s and 
Lazzarato’s false consciousness-style arguments: 
 
Once this false belief about debt (and market) is brought to consciousness, the debtor will 
see how absurd and harmful it is, and will act and think anew, as though the ‘real’ story 
of debt will illuminate the debtor’s mind, and he will liberate himself from the trap of the 
debt and will overturn the system (Caraus, 2016: 143). 
 
A further problem that false consciousness must face is that, if procedures for 
systematized understanding of the world--which make possible designations of true and false 
(what Foucault calls regimes of truth3)--are accepted as being culturally and historically specific, 
as well as socially produced and maintained (as false consciousness does seem to accept), then 
“talk of true and false consciousness [is] essentially meaningless”4 (Caraus, 2016: 143). This is a 
problem which Graeber and Lazzarato must face, and that goes for any theories which rely on 
false consciousness as an explanatory vehicle, whether or not the concept is mentioned by name. 
                                               
3 See Foucault’s “The Political Function of the Intellectual” in (Foucault, 1977). 
4 Emphasis mine. 
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Caraus thus succeeds at identifying in debt scholarship a reliance on unnamed assumptions and 
concepts which, in order to be used convincingly, require further justification.  
* * * 
When one reads Graeber’s and Lazzarato’s texts (especially in conjunction with one 
another), one of the reasons why it becomes tempting to interpret their analyses as positing debt-
as-ground is that they each, to varying degrees, take quite seriously the thought of Nietzsche. The 
quintessential (and perhaps earliest) example of debt-as-ground is to be found in essay two of 
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality. He here articulates a vision of the coproduction of 
debt and guilt, leading him ultimately to conclude that the processes of trading, exchanging, 
squaring accounts, and calculating debts are “in a certain sense thinking itself” (Nietzsche, GM: 
45). Graeber includes several of these respective passages in his chapter on “Cruelty and 
Redemption.” Lazzarato much more readily utilizes Nietzsche in his own description of the 
ascendancy of debt within neoliberalism. That each of these theorists take so seriously 
Nietzsche’s thought would seem to implicate them as seeing, like the Nietzsche of Genealogy, 
debt as constituting what it means to be human. I suggest a different interpretation, though one 
which is also arrived at by reading Graeber and Lazzarato with and against one another. In an 
effort to defend these theorists against the claim that they make debt necessarily foundational 
(and thus inhibit possibilities for resistance), I propose a reexamination of these theorists’ 
engagement with Nietzsche. After a brief summary of Nietzsche on debt and guilt, I consider 
how Graeber’s reading produces the image of a strikingly insincere Nietzsche. I then argue that if 
such a reading is made to overlay Lazzarato’s analysis, we are left not with debt as necessarily 
constituting all human relations, but rather as increasingly constituting those social relations 
which accompany market economies. I argue that Graeber, Lazzarato, and Nietzsche all take 
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debt to be constitutive of social relations qua market exchange, but that such a view is 
























III.     Entangled Genealogies  
Nietzsche on Debt and Guilt 
I will here outline the general argument of the second essay of Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morality, both as it draws on Nietzsche’s previous work and as it is taken up in the 
contemporary works to be discussed later. Considered in its entirety, Nietzsche’s Genealogy is 
an expansion of the earlier critiques found in his publication from the previous year, Beyond 
Good and Evil (1886). In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche fashions as a target his philosophical 
predecessors working in ethical theory, whom he claims are guilty of a shared dogmatism. 
Nietzsche thinks that philosophical systems stem from a sort of confession. Ethical theories, 
rather than expressing universal truths, are windows into the psyches of their authors, who write 
philosophical accounts in order to justify their own behaviors. Against these dogmatists, 
Nietzsche foretells the arrival of a new philosophical generation of ‘free spirits.’ Concerning this 
new generation, Nietzsche questions: 
 
Are they new friends of ‘truth’, these approaching philosophers? Probably so, for until 
now all philosophers have loved their truths. But it is certain that they will not be 
dogmatists. It would surely go against their pride, and also against good taste, if their 
truth had to be a truth for everyone else, too—this has been the secret wish and ulterior 
thought in all earlier dogmatic endeavors (Nietzsche, BGE: 40). 
 
Instead of using philosophy dogmatically, merely to justify their own behaviors, actions, and 
prejudices, Nietzsche sees in this new generation a willingness to experiment with philosophy, 
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and to take strange and unique arguments to their radical conclusions in an effort to create 
meaning where previously there was none. As Graeber will argue, Nietzsche acts in precisely 
this manner in his treatment of debt and guilt in Genealogy.   
Whereas Beyond Good and Evil criticized ethical theory in philosophy, Genealogy is a 
response to the lack of historicity Nietzsche sees in writings by earlier historians or 
“genealogists” of morality. Though not fully captured by its title, Genealogy is a collection of 
Nietzsche’s own genealogies of different moral concepts, the manifold of which amounts to his 
genealogy of morality at large. Essay one of Genealogy is the beginning of a much more 
developed argument than what appeared in Beyond Good and Evil. It is in the first essay of 
Genealogy that his popular discussions of the pairings good/bad and good/evil, along with their 
transitional condition ressentiment, are to be found. The ideas expressed in the first essay are 
among the most popular associated with Nietzsche, in part because versions and vestiges of them 
can be found in his other writings. The topic of the second essay, namely the comorbid 
development of guilt and debt, is not easily discerned elsewhere in the Nietzsche corpus, so it is 
thus not surprising that discussions of the first essay have tended to overshadow those of the 
second. Though the second essay certainly takes a different tack, it is nonetheless performed in 
view of the same destination--that is, a more accurately grounded account of morality and its 
origins. 
 The genealogy of guilt which Nietzsche presents in the second essay begins with the 
development of the human ability to make and keep promises, and then follows a path leading to 
punishment for inability to fulfill them. Guilt is an emotion which is learned as a result of 
punishment –in other words guilt is not prior to punishment. This is the basic historical argument 
Nietzsche makes: guilt is a learned and emotional expression of morality. At some points it 
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seems as though it is merely convenient for him to draw on the picturesque example of debt 
relations, while at other times he seems to argue quite forcefully in favor of a view of debt-as-
ground, i.e. that the debtor-creditor relation is constitutive of what it means to be human. In what 
follows we will trace Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt to punishment and its moral effects.  
Nietzsche begins the second essay by contrasting the faculties of memory and 
forgetfulness. Nature’s task, he claims, is in developing in humans the ability to make and keep 
promises, an impossible task without the development also of memory. This task has been 
realized in spite of an opposing force, namely forgetfulness, which seeks to quell promising by 
rendering its fulfilment impossible. Note that he understands forgetfulness not as a passive 
faculty--it is not related to laziness--but rather as a productive one. This is in part because health 
and happiness depend to a large degree on our ability to forget. Forgetfulness thus acts as “a 
doorkeeper as it were” in order to “temporarily close the doors and windows of consciousness” 
(Nietzsche, GM: 35). Opposed to forgetfulness is another active faculty, memory, which exerts 
itself as a delay in the constancy of forgetfulness, namely when a promise is to be made. These 
are not passive processes but rather active exercises of the will. Memory is not a question of 
being “no longer able to get rid of the thought or impression” but instead an active and willing 
“no-longer-wanting-to-get-rid-of” (Nietzsche, GM: 35). Memory is required for promising 
because it is necessary for all forms of willing. Furthermore, willing requires causal thinking and 
that “man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary” (Nietzsche, GM: 
36). Before one can be held accountable for their promises, they must in other words first have 
the ability to promise, which itself requires one to have been endowed with a memory--crucial 
for willing of any type, as well as causal thinking and concepts such as regularity and necessity.5 
                                               
5 But tensions exist here, since making humanity calculable, normal, and uniform means the 
division of humanity into separate individuals, eventually resulting in the “sovereign individual, 
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What emerges is a chain reaction of psychological development, rather than a view in which 
each of those higher faculties are assumed innate.  
This process culminates in the development of a full-fledged sovereign individual freely 
able to make (or not make) promises. For of course to be able to be held accountable for one’s 
promises, one must be able to make promises (an act of the will and of memory) and one must be 
capable of keeping them (so too an act of the will and of memory). But since human 
psychological homeostasis is regulated by means of forgetfulness rather than memory, we may 
be left wondering what it is that serves to activate memory, to cause it to switch on, and to let 
remembering rather than forgetting characterize our willed actions in certain situations (such as 
when we have willed an act of promising). 
Nietzsche’s response is to argue that memory is the result of immense pain inflicted on us 
by others. He has in mind retributive acts of violence; should one hurt, slight, or injure me, I may 
exact retribution upon him by burning him, or cutting off a piece of his flesh, or otherwise 
unleashing violence against him. One of the effects of my doing this is that he remembers not 
only the violence I unleashed, nor only the pain I caused him to feel, but also lodged in his 
memory is a keen awareness of the act of transgression he committed which precipitated my 
violent reaction. In other words, “One burns something in so that it remains in one’s memory: 
only what does not cease to give pain remains in one’s memory” (Nietzsche, GM: 37). The 
faculty of memory thus appears as the cumulative effect of individual acts of remembering every 
time the human has been injured in retribution for a prior transgression. 
The development of memory through the experience of pain was necessary for the 
development of the moral concept of guilt. Nietzsche goes on to tie the experience of pain as 
                                               
the individual resembling only himself, free from the morality of custom, autonomous and 
supermoral” (Nietzsche, GM: 36).  
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payment for transgression to the sphere of debt relations, in order to argue that the “central moral 
concept ‘guilt’ had its origins in the very material concept ‘debt’” (Nietzsche, GM: 39). This part 
of Nietzsche’s argument, which is the point of contention for contemporary debt scholarship, 
will be collapsed into Graeber’s reading, particularly insofar as Graeber grapples with 
Nietzsche’s apparent argument for a theory resembling debt-as-ground. After developing 
Graeber’s unique interpretation of Nietzsche, I will argue that Lazzarato’s analysis would be 



















IV.     Cyclical Histories 
Graeber, Debt, and Insincerity  
 Let us briefly summarize the overarching project of Graeber’s history of debt before 
turning to his reading of Nietzsche. In Debt: The First 5,000 Years, Graeber argues that debt is a 
potent moral concept which arose at different times and in different contexts out of very 
particular conditions. He claims that, even today, “in the secular world, morality consists largely 
of fulfilling our obligations to others, and we have a stubborn tendency to imagine those 
obligations as debts” (Graeber, 2011: 13). His working definition is that debt consists in the 
quantification or financialization of social obligations. A central thesis of the text, to which he 
frequently returns, is that, “it’s only once we can imagine human life as a series of commercial 
transactions that we’re capable of seeing our relation to the universe in terms of debt” (Graeber, 
2011: 75). In other words, we have come to see the rules of debt as natural, universal, common 
sense, and necessary, just as we think it simply a matter of course that we must always pay back 
our debts. However, while these seemingly common-sense attitudes about debt are specific to 
our current cultural and historical context, they fail to tell the full picture. Rather than a constant 
and unchanging picture of always-existing social relations of indebtedness, Graeber offers a view 
of the last five thousand years marked by cycles between informal debt economies and trade 
mediated by bullion. We only come to see debt as beyond all interrogation because we live in a 
society where debt is ubiquitous. He argues that markets, formalized debt agreements, and trade 
mediated through coinage are not the oldest forms of trade, but rather became the dominant 
modes of exchange as a result of nation-building and widespread state violence. Cyclical, never-
stable, always-changing social configurations of trade take on a variable form. In this vein, he 
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goes to great lengths to dispel myths which he thinks inaccurately portray the history of 
economic relations.  
He begins by criticizing the liberal conception of money found everywhere dating back to 
The Wealth of Nations. Adam Smith, inheritor of earlier enlightenment thought and progenitor of 
classical liberalism, argued that money is a commodity to which everyone consents in order to 
expedite the process of exchange. He claims: “In all countries, however, men seem at last to have 
been determined by irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals 
above all other commodity” (Smith, 1776). Graeber explains that these largely unfounded 
assertions concerning the origins of markets rely on a couple of myths. According to the so-
called myth of barter, in the earliest human societies exchange was the result of barter. Barter, it 
is imagined, was an incredibly difficult and tedious form of exchange to achieve, so at some 
point, humankind, on the basis of its natural inclinations, reached a consensus that would allow 
this new creation, money, to make exchange more expedient. Unfortunately for Smith, and for 
economists ever since, the anthropological research simply fails to corroborate. Graeber tells us 
that with the rare exception of exchange between enemies, there is little evidence that pre-money 
societies engaged in barter as a mode of exchange.  
The second myth is that of primordial debts. This myth is captured by the slogan, “We 
are all born as debtors to society,” and it expresses the view that there exists: 
 
An existential debt that all of us have to the society that created us, embodied not least in 
the fact that we all continue to be completely dependent on one another for our existence, 
even if we are not completely aware of how (Graeber, 2011: 70).  
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 These two myths, the myth of barter and the myth of primordial debts, may seem far 
apart. One imagines the world to be composed of commercial transactions of equivalence, and 
the other imagines world history as the inheritance of primordial ancestral debts. But both of 
these ways of thinking are flawed since, to repeat, “It’s only once we can imagine human life as 
a series of commercial transactions that we’re capable of seeing our relation to the universe in 
terms of debt” (Graeber, 2011: 75). In other words, to think in terms of debt-as-ground or in 
terms of barter-as-ground, requires that one retroactively apply to past societies one’s current 
understanding of modern economic relations, which can only strike us as intelligible, natural, or 
useful since we find ourselves submerged in a market economy. It constitutes our frame of 
reference for how trade works, and so determines the limits of what we imagine is possible. Both 
of these mythical ways of imagining the historical foundations of the modern economy indeed 
make what are at first quite convincing claims concerning the fundamental meaning of past 
social and economic configurations, but they are only able to do so in the first place because of 
how it is we have come to think about these matters today. They represent, in a circular and 
highly unjustified move, a way of misplacing, of colonizing, of infecting our view of the past 
with our understanding our how things operate in the present.  
 It is in an attempt to illustrate this point that Graeber invokes the Nietzsche of the second 
essay of On the Genealogy of Morality (1887). He says that Nietzsche “Begins with an argument 
that might well have been taken directly from Adam Smith--but he takes it a step further than 
Smith ever dared to, insisting that not just barter, but buying and selling itself, precede any other 
form of human relationship” (Graeber, 2011: 76). He goes on to quote Nietzsche at length. I 
reproduce only an abbreviated section here: 
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The feeling of guilt, of personal obligation...had its origin, as we have seen, in the oldest 
and most primitive relationship among persons there is, in the relationship between buyer 
and seller, creditor and debtor: here for the first time a person measured himself by 
another person … Making prices, gauging values, thinking out equivalents, exchanging--
this preoccupied man’s very first thinking to such an extent that it is in a certain sense 
thinking itself… Purchase and sale, together with their psychological accessories, are 
older than even the beginnings of any societal associations and organizational forms… 
Justice at this first stage is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to 
come to terms with one another, to reach an “understanding again by means of a 
settlement--and in regard to less powerful parties, to force them to a settlement among 
themselves (Nietzsche, GM: 46). 
 
What Nietzsche suggests here is something like primordial debt theory, a type-case of debt-as-
ground, where the inability to pay back ancestors for their contributions led to a feeling of 
permanent indebtedness, which in turn led to the deification of those ancestors. Over vast 
swathes of time, through periods of conflict, conquest, and war, a plurality of gods was filtered 
down, leaving only a handful. Finally, with the singular Judeo-Christian God, the one great 
creditor, presents us with: 
 
 Christianity’s stroke of genius: God sacrificing himself for the guilt of man, God himself 
exacting payment of himself, God as the only one who can redeem from man what has 
become irredeemable for man himself--the creditor sacrificing himself for his debtor, out 
of love (is that credible?--), out of love for his debtor! (Nietzsche, GM: 63). 
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At face value, Nietzsche appears to be defending a view of debt-as-ground (‘primordial debts 
theory’ in Graeber’s language). Instead, Graeber interprets Nietzsche as being largely insincere. 
He claims that what Nietzsche is in fact doing is: 
 
Starting out from the standard, common-sense assumptions about the nature of human 
beings prevalent in his day (and to a large extent, still prevalent)--that we are rational 
calculating machines, that commercial self-interest comes before society, that “society” 
itself is just a way of putting a kind of temporary lid on the resulting conflict. That is, he 
is starting out from ordinary bourgeois assumptions and driving them to a place where 
they can only shock a bourgeois audience (Graeber, 2011: 78-9).  
 
Thus, Nietzsche’s debt-as-ground theory is conceived of by Graeber as the radical conclusion of 
something like Smith’s view of exchange. But it is one meant intentionally to shock the very 
same sort of audience that holds firmly to the very axioms from which it is derived. Again, 
Graeber explicitly takes Nietzsche’s debt-as-ground theory as disingenuous and thus as, at most, 
a rhetorical and polemical ploy meant as a caricature of bourgeois assumptions concerning the 
foundations of market economies. He takes Nietzsche as being deeply sarcastic in the above 
passages, and stemming from this insight uses them precisely to argue against primordial debt 
theory. 
* * * 
Before we transition to the thought of Lazzarato, it is worth noting that there are certainly 
ways in which Graeber’s and Lazzarato’s analyses of debt can be thought of as similar. Graeber 
posits debt as being a second-order relation which emerges out of exchange. That is, when an 
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exchange is delayed, halted, or otherwise incomplete--when one party has held up their end but 
the other is yet to repay--precisely here is where debt enters the picture. Further, what Graeber is 
calling exchange is predicated on commensurable relations of power. We can compare this 
against the other two ways of formulating economic relations which Graeber offers: hierarchy 
and communism. Hierarchy, he says, takes place when there exist massively misbalanced power 
relations between parties. Here there is to be found no commensurability of power, so no 
exchange (in the strict sense) is here possible. Communism, on the other hand, Graeber thinks of 
as the common-sense, underlying relation of generosity upon which human sociability more 
generally is structured. It consists in the reflexive giving without thought or expectation of 
reciprocity which characterizes so many of our everyday interactions.  
The view of exchange, strictly speaking, found in Graeber is a strikingly pre-Marxian 
view. Commodity exchange starting with Aristotle was thought to require that exchange be one 
of equivalents, where each party would gain only by having their needs met, but nothing more. 
For something to be an exchange, no party could lose out while the other party is unfairly 
advantaged.6 In Capital, Marx begins by treating exchange in the same manner, but finds that 
surplus value (i.e. profit, capital) is an impossibility unless one party does benefit much more 
than the other in a commercial exchange.7 Lazzarato’s treatment of exchange takes into account 
this insight, and he thinks that, by its very nature, debt--owing, lack, misbalance--in fact precedes 




                                               
6 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5.  
7 See Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 
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V.     The Nietzschean Economy  
Lazzarato, Governance, and Ubiquity  
In his 2012 book, The Making of the Indebted Man, Italian sociologist Maurizio 
Lazzarato argues that “the economy seems to have become Nietzschean” (Lazzarato, 2012: 43). 
Anyone could be forgiven for finding such a provocation to be quite baffling. Against the veiled 
irony of the reminiscent remark that, “perhaps one day, this century will be known as 
Deleuzian,”8 Lazzarato quite earnestly thinks that the economy interpreted through a Nietzschean 
lens quite accurately captures life under neoliberalism. The Nietzsche referred to here is the same 
one we encountered earlier in the second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy. In basic terms, a 
Nietzschean economy is a debt economy (a phrase which appears more than fifty times in 
Lazzarato’s text). This debt economy works in part by developing a debtor subjectivity in its 
subjects, which Lazzarato calls “indebted man.” Taking seriously the claim that “Man is no 
longer man enclosed, but man in debt,” Lazzarato argues that this increasingly universal 
subjectivity characterizes subjects’ desires, capabilities, and time (Deleuze, 1992: 6). To 
critically assess Lazzarato’s arguments about debt and subjectivity--and further to consider what 
relevance they may have to contemporary debt resistance--will require that we first clarify what 
precisely an economy defined by debt is meant to entail.  
Invoking Nietzsche’s theory in the second essay of Genealogy, he proclaims that debt, or 
the ‘debtor-creditor relation,’ is the most fundamental antagonism of social relations today. 
Implicit in this pronouncement is a disavowal of the Marxian doctrine positing the antagonism 
between bourgeoisie and proletariat as most crucial. Instead, he argues: 
                                               
8 Foucault, Michel, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 1998. 
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The debtor-creditor relationship … intensifies mechanisms of exploitation and 
domination at every level of society, for within it no distinction exists between workers 
and the unemployed, consumers and producers, working and non-working populations, 
retirees and welfare recipients. Everyone is a ‘debtor,’ accountable to and guilty before 
capital (Lazzarato, 2012: 7). 
 
Debt is therefore completely ubiquitous: it exists at all levels of society and it implicates in some 
way or another virtually everyone. Further, it is not an economic problem, nor is it a condition 
which merely arises out of some delay in the process of exchange. It operates as an apparatus of 
power meant to control us (Lazzarato, 2012: 164). He thus positions debt as a first-order relation, 
not, as in Graeber, a second-order relationship arising out of exchange. The relationship between 
creditor and debtor is for Lazzarato fundamentally unequal. This inequality does not merely arise 
out of the failure of exchange to function properly, but is rather conceptually central to exchange 
within a market economy, and increasingly so under neoliberalism.  
So what forces are at play which give rise to debt as such today? Lazzarato’s work is 
fraught with declarations of debt’s marriage with neoliberalism. He takes as his starting point the 
notion that neoliberalism works by making it a problem of personal responsibility for the 
individual to take on and bear the weight of financial insecurity. He argues that “the creditor-
debtor relation does more than ‘directly influence social relations,’ since it is itself a power 
relation … Credit or debt and their creditor-debtor relationship constitute specific relations of 
power that entail specific forms of production and control of subjectivity — a particular form of 
homo economicus, the ‘indebted man’” (Lazzarato, 2012: 30). Thus, neoliberalism justifies itself 
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ethically by claiming that it is the responsibility of the individual to manage his or her own 
economic affairs.  
Debt, and by extension, the rules of our debt economy, are governed by neoliberalism. 
Lazzarato is clear that in Making of Indebted Man: 
 
If we have here laid out a theoretical and political framework centered on the debt 
economy, it has not been so much to provide a new general and global theory of 
neoliberalism as to offer a transversal point of view from which struggles might begin 
(Lazzarato, 2012: 163-4). 
 
Nonetheless, he does present his view of neoliberal capitalism in its functioning not as a mode of 
production, but as a machine, in the sense of “a series of devices for machinic enslavement and, 
at the same time, [a] series of devices for social subjection” (Lazzarato, 2006). Enslavement 
operates at the scale of the mass, the population, before individuals have been separated out from 
one another. To be enslaved is thus to be a mere cog in a machine. The mass is farmed for its 
collective productive powers, its desires, and its affects. Subjection on the other hand operates at 
the level of the individual subject. Social subjection occurs when an individual is defined purely 
according to the uses for which the machine devises him or her.  
 This view of machinic governance, which Lazzarato borrows from Deleuze and Guattari, 
differs from the popular reading of Foucault, which suggests that governance is moving away 
from disciplinary techniques of power toward techniques of biopower. Foucault theorizes that it 
is through particular techniques of power that neoliberalism as a rationality is grounded in 
everyday practices. Techniques of power, as described by Foucault, can be further distinguished 
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between techniques of disciplinary power and techniques of biopower. Disciplinary power refers 
to corrective procedures targeted at bodies, which are meant to imbue individuals with certain 
values and sets of norms. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes discipline as a "type of 
power … comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, 
targets; it is a ‘physics' or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology” (Foucault, 1995: 215).  In 
Society Must Be Defended, Foucault describes what he calls biopower. Unlike disciplinary 
power, biopower does not work through direct coercion, force, or individualized discipline 
(Foucault, 2003). Foucault describes biopower as the careful enrollment of an entire population 
in its regulation and governance (Foucault, 1984). One example of governance through biopower 
is the welfare state. Jesook Song, writing in particular about the South Korean debt crisis, argues 
that the welfare state acts as a “[mere] tool for regulating the labor population through biopower 
(that is, elevating the quality of living for labor power)” (Song, 2011). Rather than accepting the 
welfare state as an outgrowth of humanist concern or social safety net, she suggests that the 
welfare state seeks to raise the standard of living for the express purpose of making a population 
of workers more efficient. And while there may in fact be many benefits ushered in by the 
welfare state, the end goal is a population imbued with certain attitudes toward ideas like 
reciprocity, responsibility, and nationalism. Such a mode of governance is different from 
disciplinary power in that it lacks the same overtly coercive thrust. 
 Deleuze described governance as having increasingly shifted away from disciplinary 
societies of enclosure (which operate at the level of the individual) in favor of new societies of 
control, wherein governance takes place at the level of the pre-individual, the ‘dividual.’9 
                                               
9 See Deleuze, Gilles. “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” 1992.  
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Against such a formulation, and rather than seeing control replacing discipline, Lazzarato argues 
that debt governs simultaneously at both of these levels.  
* * * 
 This section has focused on engaging with Lazzarato’s thought on governance by debt, 
especially insofar as it intersects with Deleuze’s and Foucault’s formulations of governance. The 
difficulty which remains is that of determining to what extent Lazzarato’s analysis accepts 
contingency in its argument. We have already seen his eagerness to invoke Nietzsche. First and 
very generally, he uses “Nietzsche” to demarcate “debt” in his characterization of the modern 
economy. But more specifically, he argues that the creditor-debtor relationship is the basis of all 
social relations (Lazzarato, 2012: 37). The question is, which social relations? All social 
relations, all possibilities for how we interact with one another, how we trade, or only those 
which follow from a market-style economy?  
Against interpretations of the second essay of Genealogy, which take Nietzsche as 
earnestly arguing for a view of debt-as-ground, I have argued in favor of Graeber’s insincere 
Nietzsche. This image much more comfortably suits the polemicist, and is in keeping with one of 
Nietzsche’s aims in Genealogy, which was to critique those “genealogists” whose purportedly 
historical accounts of the origins of morality he saw as strikingly ahistorical. Contemporary debt 
scholarship, especially that which makes use of Nietzsche on debt, can benefit from this 
interpretation of Nietzsche. I argue that by qualifying Lazzarato’s “Nietzschean Economy” by 
applying this reading of Nietzsche to Lazzarato’s theory, the result is a greatly improved analysis 
which is, owing to this crucial revision, much more explicitly amicable to the assumed 
contingency of social relations of indebtedness. 
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 As we have seen above, Lazzarato’s analysis seeks to make sense of the ways in which 
neoliberalism and the debt economy are able to govern at the levels of both the individual and 
the mass. Rather than accounting only for the manner by which debt disciplines and governs 
individual debtors, his theory opens up new ground for considering how the mobilization of 
affects allows neoliberalism to control entire populations in terms of their time, aspirations, 
desires, and priorities. There are thus great stakes in reaffirming the usefulness of Lazzarato’s 
analysis, and in reformulating his theory in such a way that it avoids vulnerability to a blind spot 
with respect to contingency. I claim that progress is made toward this effort by supplanting 

















VI.     Conclusion 
Prolegomena to Any Future Debt Resistance 
   There is no doubt that the projects of both Graeber and Lazzarato constitute debt-centric 
analyses of political economy. The question which remains is: What are the consequences of a 
debt-centric analysis of political economy? There exist any number of possible metrics for 
arriving at an answer. I contend that the best metric is the success or failure of on-the-ground 
political movements inspired by relevant theoretical insights. That this means that our way of 
answering the above question (concerning specifically the usefulness of a particular type of 
analysis) is subordinated to pre-established political goals and attitudes is an implication I am 
happy to accept, since procedures of analysis are always already political--they are always issued 
forth with politically-informed ideas about how designations of true and false, right and wrong, 
etc. are to be made. The suggestion here is simply that we recognize and accept from the outset 
that this is the case, state clearly and unabashedly the politics which motivate our inquiry, while 
knowing full well that our conclusions would have looked much different had we begun with a 
different set of assumptions, premises, and goals.   
 Political and ideological commitments issued forth from economists for the past several 
centuries have attempted (with immense success) to make so-called economic laws appear 
perfectly natural in an effort to obscure the fact that they are in fact constructions. A prime 
example of this is the manner in which Adam Smith, writing in the age of the Enlightenment and 
following Newton, sought to render lawlike the emerging field of economics. His theory that 
primordial societies operated according to exchange via barter, which for perfectly natural 
reasons gave way to commodity exchange mediated by money, is one not supported by 
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anthropological evidence. But nonetheless, it stuck, not because of supporting evidence but 
because it is, as Graeber observes, so difficult for us to imagine life before markets. 
Graeber and Lazzarato each proffer theories which highlight the ubiquity of debt. 
Graeber’s historical project suggests that debt and credit preceded the use of money. However, 
just because debt is dated earlier does not mean that it must be taken as necessarily foundational. 
As we might imagine, for the earliest societies social coordination worked because each member 
of the community relied on and came to expect the cooperation of his or her neighbors. We 
might choose to describe this relation as a sort of collective indebtedness to community. 
However, we must be careful not to render too confusing our concepts. The intelligibility of debt 
as a concept differs depending upon the particular context in which we are using it. As Graeber 
painstakingly argues, it is only following the advent of commodity exchange and the increasingly 
widespread use of money that debt begins to become associated with suspicion, mistrust, and sin. 
The debt referred to in an imagined primordial “collective indebtedness” scheme will thus not be 
debt at all, so long as we resolve to continue using the concept according to conventions which 
have developed over the past several millennia.  
Debt is ubiquitous in Graeber’s analysis only insofar as debt is a concept which we tend 
to over-apply, which is a condition of our increasingly financialized times. Against the impulse 
to increasingly render our world intelligible strictly by means of financial concepts and market 
logics, we find in Graeber an injunction to critically interrogate and historicize those everyday 
concepts whose illusive meanings are so often papered-over with seemingly common-sense 
ethical maxims. This is a tradition which he inherits from Nietzsche, whose project in Genealogy 
was to critique what he saw as the largely ahistorical and inaccurate attempts at grounding 
morality by his predecessors. Our above analysis of the second essay of Genealogy exemplifies 
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this. Rather than taking seriously his primordial debts posit, we should adopt Graeber’s reading 
of an insincere Nietzsche. By taking Smith’s assumptions to their radical conclusion, insincere 
Nietzsche demonstrates the limits of conceiving of humanity, in all its diverse possibility, as 
being grounded necessarily in commercial transactions. This in turn casts much doubt on 
prevailing classical liberal assumptions about free exchange, rational choice, and self-interest.  
The context in which Lazzarato is writing is one in which these prevailing economic 
assumptions dominate. With the rapid explosion of indebtedness ranging from consumer and 
student loan debt to national debts, the stakes are as high as ever. Lazzarato’s analysis of the 
plurality of ways by which debt serves to discipline, control, and govern opens up new spaces for 
political resistance and critique. His analysis not only considers the individual techniques of 
disciplinary power which OSDC and Strike Debt sought to uncover, it further anticipates 
increasingly affective modes of governance within neoliberalism. Since the stakes are so high, 
and since Lazzarato’s analysis so effectively breaks new ground for critique and political 
mobilization, it is all the more necessary that the usefulness and relevance of his theory be 
secured by making it compatible with the contingency of social relations. This thesis has sought 
to help fill in this gap by suggesting that we supplant Graeber’s insincere Nietzsche in place of a 
face-value reading in order to strengthen Lazzarato’s analysis.  
I claim that when applying something like Graeber’s Nietzsche to Lazzarato’s theories, it 
becomes easier to recognize how all three of them, rather than proffering decided views of debt-
as-ground, instead employ such language at times in an effort to describe the terrain of the social 
within capitalism, according to market logics, but that such need not be the case. Their projects 
prove much more useful if understood as pointing to the opening up of possibility, rather than its 
Johnson 40 
foreclosure. I will close with a quote from Alain Badiou which captures what I take to be the best 
way of approaching our questions concerning contingency: 
 
The conception of politics that we defend is far from the idea that ‘everything is 
possible’. In fact, it’s an immense task to try to propose a few possibilities, in the plural - 
a few possibilities other than what we are told is possible. It is a matter of showing how 
the space of the possible is larger than the one we are assigned - that something else is 
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